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While logic was once developed to serve philosophers and mathematicians, it is increasingly serving the
varied needs of computer scientists. In fact, recent decades have witnessed the creation of the new discipline
of Computational Logic. While Computation Logic can claim involvement in diverse areas of computing,
little has been done to systematize the foundations of this new discipline. Here, we envision a unity for
Computational Logic organized around the proof theory of the sequent calculus: recent results in the area of
focused proof systems will play a central role in developing this unity.
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1. SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE CORRECTNESS
IS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT
Computer systems are everywhere in our society
and their integration with all parts of our lives is
constantly increasing: accompany this wide scale use of
computing systems comes an increasing need to deal
with their correctness. There are a host of computer
systems—such as those in cars, airplanes, missiles,
hospital equipment—where correctness of software
is paramount. Big changes in the attitude towards
correctness is also taking place in the area of consumer
electronics. For example, years ago, establishing the
correctness of, say, desktop PCs, music players, and
telephones was not urgent since rebooting such systems
to recover from errors or living without a feature
due to bugs were mostly nuisances and not “life-
threatening.” But today, these same devices are now
tightly integrated into networks and, hence, they must
deal with information security and user anonymity while
trying to keep safe from malicious software.
Attempting to establish various kinds of correctness-
related properties of software systems is no longer an
academic curiosity. The old chestnut “You can’t build a
tall building on a sandy beach,” which is so often invoked
to argue for solid foundations for engineering projects,
needs a modern updating that requires moving off the
beach to the sea: “If you are in a canoe, a small leak
might be okay; if you are in a submarine, a small leak
is lethal.” As it is painfully clear today, plugging your
computer into the internet is similar to descending into
the depth of the sea: if there is a crack in your security, it
will be exploited quickly. One cannot be relaxed anymore
about leaks.
Our ability to provide at least some formal guarantees
about software systems will be directly related to our
ability to deploy new functionality and services. If we
cannot distinguish applets from viruses, we cannot
expect people to really use the rich set of flexible
services organized around mobile code. Our future could
resemble elements of the world in William Gibson’s
Virtual Light, where network security was so bad that
important data was transferred by bikers carrying hard-
disks! If we cannot produce software that has some
formal guarantees, then the development of all the new
features and services—and the concomitant increases in
efficiency and productivity—that we all hope to see soon
will be greatly delayed.
2. LOGIC IS A KEY
It is to logic that researchers, designers, and practition-
ers turn to help address the problems of establishing
formal properties. The importance of logic comes, in
part, because of its universal character and the rich set
of results surrounding it. Logic can also play a number of
roles viz-a-viz software systems. For example, logic can
be used to formally establish correctness (e.g., proving
a program correct). Given its universal character, it can
also be used as a language for communicating meaning
between different entities. For example, designers of pro-
gramming languages often use logic-based formalisms
to communicate the precise semantics of their designs to
users or language implementers. Also, when machines
exchange data and programs, increasing use is made of
logic-based expressions such as types, memory layout
specifications, assertions, interface requirements, proof
certificates (e.g., in the proof carrying code setting), etc.
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Indeed, it has been variously argued that logic plays a
role in computer science similar to that played by the
calculus of Newton and Leibniz in the physical sciences
and engineering disciplines (20). Twenty years ago,
Martin Davis (10) observed that mathematical logic had
already formed an intimate relationship with computer
science.
When I was a student, even the topologists
regarded mathematical logicians as living in
outer space. Today the connections between
logic and computers are a matter of engi-
neering practice at every level of computer
organization. . . . Issues and notions that first
arose in technical investigations by logicians
are deeply involved, today, in many aspects
of computer science.
Since these words were written, the deep involvement of
these two disciplines has grown so rich that it has given
rise to the new field of computational logic.
3. ... BUT LOGIC HAS BEEN BADLY FRACTURED
While there is some recognition that logic is a unifying
and universal discipline underlying computer science, it
is far more accurate to say that its universal character
has been badly fractured in the past few decades along
a number of axes.
• Logic has entered into a wide range of application
areas, including, for example, computer architec-
ture, databases, software engineering, program-
ming languages, computational linguistics, and ar-
tificial intelligence. These different application ar-
eas have been pushing their own agendas on how
logic should be exploited.
• The number of adjectives that are routinely
added to the word “logic” is extensive: first-order,
higher-order, classical, intuitionistic, linear, modal,
temporal, deontic, dynamic, quantum, etc. With
so many adjectives in common use today, one
wonders if there is any sense to insisting that there
is a core notion of “logic”.
• There are a large number of computational
logic tools in regular used and development:
model checkers, interactive and automatic theo-
rem provers, logic circuit simulators/testers, type
inference systems, SAT solvers, etc. Within each
of these categories, there are a plethora of specific
techniques and tools that often have little relation-
ship to one another.
The use of the word “fractured” here is deliberate.
Developing many different sub-disciplines is a typical
development within maturing disciplines: for example,
within mathematics, there are a great many adjectives
applied to the term algebra. In the algebraic case,
however, many of those sub-disciplines of algebras were
developed to provide for commonality by making more
abstract previously developed and disparate algebraic
structures. But one sees little effort within the literature
of computational logic to provide for commonality.
Specialization has made it possible for logic to contribute
significantly in these many application areas and to
attract the interest of many in industry. However, this
fracturing of logic comes with a high cost to the discipline
and it greatly diminishes its potential. In particular,
theoretical and implementation results achieved in one
slice of applied logic are seldom exported to other
slices. Similarly, great efforts are applied to develop
tools, libraries, and packages for one tool that are
closely related to large efforts based in other tools. More
serious still is that people working in one narrow domain
will sometimes think of their sub-domain as being the
universal formalism: since they are missing the bigger
picture, they invent ways to make their domain more
expressive even when much of what is needed is already
accounted for in (other slices of) logic.
In this paper, we argue that there needs to be forces that
are pushing against this fracturing and that attempts to
see computation logic as organized around a core set of
concepts. We shall offer such a set of concepts.
4. A BRIEF HISTORY
We provide a quick overview of the origins and state-of-
the-art of computational logic.
4.1. The early dreams for logic
One of the first lessons that one learns about logic is
that it is secure and universal. These attributes were
part of Leibniz’s hope for a universal, formal language
in which all disputes could be answered simply by “Let
us calculate . . . and see who is right” (22). The first
formal system that could claim both security of deduction
(soundness) and universality (completeness) was first-
order logic which can be formalized using both syntactic
means (proofs) and semantic means (truth). On such
a secure foundations, one can build set theory and
much of mathematics. An early and natural goal for
computational logic was the following:
Let us implement logic (and why not, since its syntactic
side is organized around a small set of proof principles):
we shall then have an implementation of mathematics.
Early dreams in automated reasoning focused on simple
and theoretically complete methods with the hope that
they would be complete in practice. The hope was to
have one framework, one implementation, and universal
2
Finding Unity in Computational Logic
applicability. We describe two threads in deploying
universal methods for logic.
Automated and interactive provers In the 1960-
1970’s, there was a great deal of work done on
implementing automated systems for first-order logic
that were based on such complete paradigms as
resolution (37) or on conditional rewriting (7). Such
early work produced a great deal of information about
proof strategies and methods to implement formal logical
systems effectively (unification, backtracking search,
etc). Another lesson was, however, disappointing: those
systems came no where near to achieving the ambitions
of effective, universal deployment. Furthermore, it was
clear that the usual speed up in program execution that
resulted from improvements in hardware and compilers
would not make a dent in the “state-explosion” that
occurred within such provers. Starting around the same
time (and continuing today), a number of interactive
proof environments for mathematics were developed:
for example, Nqthm (7), Mizar (39), Coq (9), NuPRL
(8), HOL (19), PVS (33), and Matita (3). Most of these
systems chose either first-order logic with induction or
a higher-order constructive logic based on intuitionistic
logic as a suitable framework for encoding mathematics.
The architecture of several of these systems were
influenced directly or indirectly by Automath (11) and
LCF (34). While interaction was central to the functioning
of such systems, they all allowed automation to some
extent, often using tactics and tacticals.
Model checkers and logic programming By shifting
one’s attention to simpler theorems involving weaker
properties (for example, shifting from full correctness
to detecting deadlocks), one can employ logic and
deduction using the ideas and techniques found in
model checking (13; 36). While great successes can
be claimed for such systems, the hope of having a
universal approach to model checking quickly ran into
the state explosion problem. Logic programming can be
used to explore membership in still weaker relations.
Prolog exploits the Horn clause fragment of first-order
logic to provide a programming language that can,
after a fashion, turn some declarative specifications into
proper programs. Ultimately, the dream of deductively
describing a relation and then getting an effective
implementation of it turned out to be largely illusory.
4.2. Specialization and fracturing
Much of this early work yielded important results and
lessons. One of those lessons was, however, that
universal methods were usually of little practical use and
that the hope to deploy them in even rather weak settings
was naive. This early work then lead to a new phase in
the employment of logic for mathematics and computer
science.
Pick a domain and specialize One way to make
deductive systems more practical involves having
researchers focus on applications and sub-domains.
Once an application domain is narrowed significantly,
specific approaches to deduction in that setting could
be developed. There have been any number of
highly successful examples of this style of narrow-
and-specialize, including, for example, SAT solvers,
deductive databases, type systems, static analysis,
logic circuits, etc. Such systems are making routine
and important contributions in day-to-day practice.
Unfortunately, success in one narrow topic is seldom
translated to a success in another topic.
Working within frameworks In (35), Paulson
described his Isabelle theorem prover as a generic
framework in which the “next 700 theorem provers” could
be written. The argument (largely implicit in that paper)
is that writing theorem provers is a difficult task and
future designers of theorem provers should work within
an established framework. Such a framework can help
to ensure correct implementations of core deduction
features as well as provide for basic user-interfaces, and
integration with various specialized inference engines
(for example, Presburger arithmetic). Such frameworks
are now popular choices and allow proof system
developers to either explicitly design new logics (as is
the case in Isabelle) or extend the deductive powers
of a core prover using various library and package
mechanisms (as is the case in many other provers such
as Coq, HOL, and NuPRL). Working entirely within a
particular logical framework is certainly a conservative
perspective that is the appropriate choice in many
situations.
4.3. Verification is too big for a monolithic
treatment
The universal applicability of logic and its associate proof
methods for computer system verification has also been
attacked from another angle. De Millo, Lipton, and Perlis
(29) have stressed that formal proofs (in the sense
often attributed to mathematics) is unlikely to work for
the verification of computer systems give that the latter
involves social processes, evolving specifications, and
remarkably complex specifications and programs.
On many occasions in computer science, a negative
result can be productive: witness, for example, how the
undecidability of the halting problem lead the extensive
study of specialized domains where decidability can
be established. Similarly here: if one accepts the
negative premise that logic and formal proof cannot
solve the problems of verifying computer systems,
then one might expect to see an explosion of many
logics and proof systems used on many smaller
aspects of building correct software. For example, the
social processes involved in building computer systems
must communicate precisely among various people
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involved in that process. There are many things that
need to be communicated between the members of
the society (tools, types, static analyzes, operational
semantics, examples, counter-examples, etc). Logic,
with its precision and formal properties can and has
been applied to aid such communications. Not all
things, of course, are logic but logic offers an extremely
valuable aid in defining, formalizing, automating, and
communicating many aspects of software systems.
Thus, the impossibility of using one logic and one formal
method leads to the need to have many specialized
logics and methods.
5. METHODOLOGY
Our approach to unity for computational logic is based
on the follow main methodological points.
5.1. Dropping mathematics as an intermediate
This proposal deals with the role of logic in not
only specifying computation but also reasoning about
computation: reasoning about mathematics is not, a
priori, our concern. This choice of emphasis actually
has significant consequences. In particular, consider the
following.
The traditional approach to reasoning about computation
in almost all ambitious frameworks today follows the
following two step approach.
Step 1: Implement mathematics. This step is achieved
by picking a general, well understood formal
system. Common choices are first-order logic,
set theory, or some foundation for constructive
mathematics, such as a higher-order intuitionistic
logic.
Step 2: Reduce computation to mathematics. Computa-
tion is generally encoded via some model theoretic
semantics (such as denotational semantics) or as
an inductive definition over an operational seman-
tics.
A key methodological element of this proposal is that we
shall drop mathematics as an intermediate and attempt
to find more direct and intimate connections between
computation, reasoning, and logic. The main problem
with having mathematics in the middle seems to be that
many aspects of computation are rather “intensional”
but a mathematical treatment requires an extensional
encoding. The notion of algorithm is an example of this
kind of distinction: there are many algorithms that can
compute the same function (say, the function that sorts
lists). In a purely extensional treatment, it is functions
that are represented directly and algorithm descriptions
that are secondary. If an intensional default can be
managed instead, then function values are secondary
(usually captured via the specification of evaluators or
interpreters).
For a more explicit example, consider whether or not
the formula ∀wi. λx.x 6= λx.w is a theorem. In a
setting where λ-abstractions denote functions (the usual
extensional treatment), we have not provided enough
information to answer this question: in particular, this
formula is true if and only if the domain type i is not
a singleton. If, however, we are in a setting where
λ-abstractions denote syntactic expressions, then it is
sensible for this formula to be provable since no (capture
avoiding) substitution of an expression of type i for the w
in λx.w can yield λx.x.
Computation is full of intensional features besides
bindings within syntax, including, for example, the usage
of resources such as time and space. Mathematical
techniques can treat intensionality, but experience with
such treatments demonstrate that they do not reach
the level of “canonicity” that is reached by similar
encoding techniques that have been successful for
functions and sets. We shall, instead, look for logical and
proof theoretic treatments of many of these intensional
aspects of computation.
5.2. Proof theory provides a framework
We shall propose using proof theory, particularly the
proof theory of the sequent calculus, as the unifying
framework behind computational logic. Proof theory
seems to be far more intimately related to computation
given its reliance on (mostly) finitary methods: this is
in contrast, say, to the mathematics of model theory
where there are generally infinitely many models to
consider and these models generally have infinite
extension. Proof theory provides elegant treatments of
various intensional aspects of computation (for example,
resources in linear logic) and provides some rich and
flexible avenues of reasoning that go along way in
providing a rich and flexible framework.
Gentzen (15) invented the sequent calculus to solve a
problem in the unity of logic. Gentzen wished to prove
that both classical and intuitionistic logic satisfied the
Hauptsatz, namely, that inference did not need to have
detours or lemmas. His goal was to prove this one result
for both logics simultaneously. After failing to prove such
a meta-theorem using natural deduction, he invented
the sequent calculus along with the important notions
of structural rules and cut-elimination (we provide a
primer for the sequent calculus in Section 6). He was
then able to describe one procedure for the elimination
of the cut rule (corresponding to the in-lining of the
proof of lemmas) that proved the Hauptsatz (now stated
as the admissibility of the cut-rule) for both logics
simultaneously.
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With the introduction of linear logic (16), Girard has
expanded on these themes of using the sequent
calculus, the structural rules, and cut-elimination. As
a result the expressiveness and utility of the sequent
calculus for computational purposes has been greatly
extended. It is this setting that we propose to use for an
explicit attempt at unifying much of computational logic.
5.3. Logic considered broadly but with a standard
What exactly is logic? Since we are exploring the
frontiers of what logic can be for computer science, we
do not try to completely define it here. On the other hand,
we have the most ambitious plans for logic. In particular,
we shall always use it as a term that can be ascribed
“beauty” in the sense of the following quotation.
We ascribe beauty to that which is simple; which has no
superfluous parts; which exactly answers its end; which
stands related to all things; which is the mean of many
extremes. — Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Beauty” in (14)
In particular: logic is simple, given by its natural and
universal syntax and small sets of inference rules; logic
has no superfluous parts, which is the promised of
such formal results as the cut-elimination theorem; logic
exactly answers its ends for describing static truth or
computational dynamics, as witnessed by soundness
and (relative) completeness results; logic is related to
all things computational and its role in the foundations
of computer science is often compared to the role of
calculus in the foundations of physics (20); and, finally,
logic is the mean of many extremes given its intimate
use in a range of “extremes” including databases,
programming languages, type systems, certificates,
verification, model checking, etc.
We shall also not try to find a single setting to discuss all
things that have been referred to as logic. In particular,
we shall mostly limit ourselves to classical, intuitionistic,
and linear logic since they have a long and well
established relations to computing. Many other logics,
such as modal, spatial, tense, etc, will be explicitly
left out of this discussion, even though many of them
can be understood as embeddings into or modular
extensions to one of these core logics. Even with
a focus on three core logics, there are many ways
that these can be elaborated (eg., propositional versus
quantificational, first-order versus higher-order, with or
without equality) and there are many proof systems
for these logics (sequent, natural deduction, tableaux,
Hilbert-style, matrix methods, etc.).
5.4. A big logic with many sublogics
We shall look to logic to be a universal language
and proof theory as a universal framework to organize
and infer structure about both logic and computation.
Logic can be composed of a great many connectives,
quantifiers, etc. Proof theory teaches us that if we can
achieve cut-elimination for logics, then we can expect
that most features of logic fit together orthogonally.
That is, they do not interact or, if they interact, that
interaction is made evident and controlled. As a result
of this orthogonality, we have the opportunity to see
logic as a rather large collection of possible connectives,
quantifiers, and other operators (e.g., exponentials,
modals, fixed points (6), and subexponentials (31)) and
that we can choose from these as we wish. In this
sense, the propositional classical logic system used
within SAT solvers is, in fact, just one of many subset of,
say, higher-order linear logic. Modern proof theory also
teaches us that contexts and their associated structural
rules (in contrast to introduction and elimination rules)
play an important role in describing logics. But again,
the choice of what structural rules to use is largely
orthogonal to other choices. For example, Gentzen’s
original version of the sequent calculus was developed
to unify the treatment of classical and intuitionistic logic:
the difference between these two logics was governed
by structural rules. Girard later showed that linear logic
could fit into this same scheme by further varying
the structural rules. Richer integration is also possible,
where, say, linear and classical connectives can exist
together (17; 24).
5.5. Two-levels of logic
It is also clear that there are limits to some integrations of
logic. In particular, if logic is use to specify computations
(i.e., by having proofs be computation traces) then
reasoning about such computations might well need to
be based on a different logic. The standard division of
object-level and meta-level reasoning works here. Even
in this setting, some important integration is still possible:
in particular, terms structures and their associated
binding operators can be shared between the meta-logic
and the object-logic.
6. A PRIMER FOR PROOF THEORY AND SEQUENT
CALCULUS
We shall assume that the reader has some familiarity
with the sequent calculus. Below we recall some
definitions and results.
Sequents are generally presented as a pair Γ ⊢ ∆
of two (possibly empty) collections of formulas. For
Gentzen, these collections were lists but multisets and
sets are also used. Such sequents are also called two-
sided sequents. Intuitively, the formulas on the left-hand-
side (in Γ) are viewed as assumptions and formulas
on the right-hand-side (in ∆) are viewed as possible
conclusions: thus, an informal reading of the judgment
described by the sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ is “if all the formulas in
Γ are true then some formula in ∆ is true.” This reading,
however, is only suggestive since sequents will be used
in settings where the notion of truth is either not present
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or is meant to be developed independently. In calculi
with an involutive negation (such as classical logic), two-
sided sequents are often replaced by simpler one-side
sequents: in particular, the sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ is written,
instead, as ⊢ ¬Γ,∆ (placing ¬ in front of a collection of
formulas is taken as the collection of negated formulas).
In the remainder of this paper, we shall assume that the
collections of formulas used in sequents are multisets.
A formula is atomic if its top-level constant is a non-
logical symbol, namely, a predicate symbol. A literal is
an atom or a negated atom.
6.1. Three classes of inference rules
Sequent calculus proof systems come with inference
rules in which a sequent is the conclusion and zero or
more sequents are premises. These rules are usually
broken down into three classes of rules. The structural
rules are the following two, applied to either the left or
right side.
Contraction:
Γ, B,B ⊢ ∆
Γ, B ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆, B,B
Γ ⊢ ∆, B
Weakening:
Γ ⊢ ∆
Γ, B ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆, B
The identity rules are also just two, called Initial and Cut.
B ⊢ B
Initial
Γ1 ⊢ ∆1, B Γ2, B ⊢ ∆2
Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ ∆1,∆2
Cut
The meta-theory of most sequent calculus presentations
of logic includes results that say that most instances
of these identity rules are, in fact, not necessary. The
cut-elimination theorem states that removing the cut-
rule does not change the set of provable sequents.
Furthermore, the initial rule can usually be eliminated for
all cases except when B is an atomic formula.
The third and final collection of inference rules are the
introduction rules which describe the role of the logical
connectives in proof. In two-sided sequent calculus
proofs, these are usually organized as right and left
introduction rules for the same connective. In one-
sided sequent calculus proofs, these rules are organized
as right-introduction rules for a connective and its De
Morgan dual. For example, here are two examples of
pairs of introduction rules.
Γ, B1, B2 ⊢ ∆
Γ, B1 ∧B2 ⊢ ∆
Γ1 ⊢ ∆1, B1 Γ2 ⊢ ∆2, B2
Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ ∆1,∆2, B1 ∧B2
Γ, B[t/x] ⊢ ∆
Γ,∀xB ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆, B[y/x]
Γ ⊢ ∆,∀xB
The right-introduction rule for ∀ has the proviso that
the eigenvariable y does not have a free occurrence
in any formula in Γ ∪ ∆. Notice that in both of these
sets of rules, there is exactly one new occurrence of a
logical connective in the premise when compared to the
premises.
Notice that some inference rules are invertible: that is, if
their conclusion is provable then all their premises are
provable. Of the four introduction rules above, the left
rule for ∧ and the left rule for ∀ are invertible: the other
two introduction rules are not necessarily invertible.
When presenting a sequent calculus proof system for
a specific logic, one usually presents the introduction
rules for the logical connectives of the logic and
usually accepts both identity inference rules (initial
and cut). The structural rules are, however, seldom
adopted without restriction. For example, intuitionistic
logic can be understood as a two-sided sequent calculus
in which the contraction-right rule is not allowed.
Multiplicative-additive linear logic (MALL) admits neither
weakening nor contraction and full linear logic allows
those structural rules only for specially marked formulas
(formulas marked with the so-called exponentials !
and ?). Classical logic, however, generally admits the
structural rules unrestricted.
6.2. Capturing computation via proof search
When considered abstractly, the operational semantics
of functional programming can be viewed as a
systematic process for eliminating cuts from a proof.
(In certain sequent calculi for intuitionistic logic, there
are nice connections to draw between cut-elimination
and β-reduction (38).) Our framework here for unity
involves, instead, using the proof search approach
to computational specification. With this approach,
one considers the dynamics of computation as the
process of attempting to build a cut-free proof from
conclusion to premises. As one moves up a proof
tree, sequents change and that change captures the
dynamics of computation. The cut rule and the cut-
elimination theorem is generally used not as part
of computation but as a means to reason about
computation. The proof search approach to specification
has been used to formalize the operational semantics of
logic programming (27).
6.3. Proof theory as an approach to meaning
“Proof theory semantics” is a term that has been
used for a number of years, largely in the narrow and
philosophical context of determining the proper meaning
of the logical connectives (21). Such a style semantics
uses the inference rules (the “uses” of the connectives)
as the origin of meaning and then employs the meta-
theory of, for example, sequent calculus as the formal
setting for organizing that meaning. Girard’s slogan for
motivating Ludics, “From the rules of logic to the logic
of rules” (18), is another illustration of placing inference
rules at the center of system of meaning. The author
has similarly described the value of replacing model
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theory with proof theory as the vehicle for describing the
meaning of logic-based programming languages (25).
Example: Alan Turing encoded computation using
strings, machines, and computation traces. He used
these to reason about the power of computing via
standard mathematical techniques (inductive definitions,
set-theoretical constructions, encodings as functions,
etc). While this mathematical framework was highly
appropriate for his particular goals of proving the
first theorems about limitations of computation, that
framework has not served us well when we wish to
reason about the meaning of specific computations. In
the proof theory approach to relational programming,
computation can be described using terms, formulas,
and cut-free proofs. On one hand, such cut-free proofs
encode computation traces in much the same way
as Turing’s computation traces. On the other hand,
there is a great deal of structure and many formal
results surrounding sequent calculus proofs that make
it possible to reason richly about computation using
abstractions, substitutions, and cut-elimination (26).
7. FOCUSED PROOF SYSTEMS
If we try to take the construction of proofs literally as a
model for performing computation, one is immediately
struck by the inappropriateness of sequents calculus for
this task: there are just too many ways to build proofs and
most of them differ in truly minor ways. While permuting
the application of inference rules may yield proofs of
different sequents, quite often such permutations yield
different proofs of the same sequent. One would wish
to have a much tighter correspondence between the
application of an inference rule and sometime that might
appear as an interesting “action” within a computation.
One of the first attempts to provide the sequent calculus
with normal forms that could correspond to computation
was the work on uniform proofs and backchaining (27)
that was used to provide a proof theory foundation of
logic programming. It was, however, Andreoli’s focused
proof system (1) for linear logic that really allowed
one to more richly restriction and organize the sequent
calculus. The earlier work on uniform proofs was rather
limited, both in its “focusing behavior” and in the subsets
of logic to which it could be applied. Andreoli’s result,
however, applied to a full and rich logic. We provide here
a high-level outline of the key ideas behind focused proof
systems.
Focused proofs are generally divided into two, alter-
nating phases. The first phase incorporates the infer-
ence rules that are invertible. This phase, sometimes
also called the negative or asynchronous phase, ends
(reading the proof from conclusion to premises) when
all invertible inference rules have been applied. The
second phase selects a formula on which to “focus”:
the inference rule that is applied to this formula is not
necessarily invertible. Furthermore, if after the (reverse)
application of that introduction rule, a subformula of
that focused formula appears that also requires a non-
invertible inference rule, then the phase continues with
that subformula as the new focus. This second phase,
also called the positive or synchronous phase, ends
when either the proof ends with an instance of the initial
rule or when only formulas with invertible inference rules
are encountered. Certain “structural” rules are used to
recognize the end of a phase or the switch from one
phase to another.
7.1. A focused proof system for classical logic
This description of a focused proof system is only
approximate. It is better to present a complete focused
proof system to see a concrete example. Consider
a presentation of first-order classical logic in which
negations are applied only to atomic formulas and where
the propositional connectives t, f , ∧, and ∨ are replaced
by two “polarized” versions: t−, t+, f−, f+, ∧−, ∧+, ∨−,
∨+. We shall also assume that to complete the notion of
polarized formula, the atomic formulas are also polarized
either positively or negatively. A formula is negative if it is
a negative atom, the negation of a positive atom, or if its
top-level connective is one of t−, f−, ∧−, ∨−. A formula is
positive if it is a positive atom, the negation of a negative
atom, or if its top-level connective is one of t+, f+, ∧+,
∨+. Notice that taking the De Morgan dual of a formula
causes its polarity to flip.
The inference rules for the LKF focused proof system
(23) for classical logic is given in Figure 1. Sequents are
divided into negative sequents ⊢ Θ ⇑ Γ and positive
sequents ⊢ Θ ⇓ B, where Θ and Γ are multisets
of formulas and B is a formula. (These sequents are
formally one-sided sequents: formulas on the left of
⇑ and ⇓ are not negated as they are in two-sided
sequents.) Notice that in this focused proof system, we
have reused the term “structural rule” for a different set
of rules which formally contains instances of weakening
(Id) and contraction (Focus). Notice also that in any
proof that has a conclusion of the form ⊢ · ⇑ B, the only
formulas that are to the left of an ⇑ or ⇓ occurring in that
proof are either positive formulas or negative literals: it is
only these formulas that are weakened (in the Id rule).
The only formulas contracted (in the Focus rule) are
positive formulas. Thus, although linear logic is not used
here directly, non-atomic negative formulas are treated
linearly in the sense that they are never duplicated nor
weakened in an LKF proof.
LetB be a formula of first-order logic. By a polarization of
B we mean a formula, say B′, where all the propositional
connectives are replaced by polarized versions of the
same connective and where all atomic formulas are
assigned either a positive or negative polarity. Thus,




⊢ Θ, C ⇑ Γ
⊢ Θ ⇑ Γ, C
Store
⊢ Θ ⇑ N
⊢ Θ ⇓ N
Release
⊢ P,Θ ⇓ P
⊢ P,Θ ⇑ ·
Focus
⊢ ¬P,Θ ⇓ P
Id (literal P )
Introduction of negative connectives
⊢ Θ ⇑ Γ, t−
⊢ Θ ⇑ Γ, A ⊢ Θ ⇑ Γ, B
⊢ Θ ⇑ Γ, A ∧− B
⊢ Θ ⇑ Γ
⊢ Θ ⇑ Γ, f−
⊢ Θ ⇑ Γ, A,B
⊢ Θ ⇑ Γ, A ∨− B
⊢ Θ ⇑ Γ, A
⊢ Θ ⇑ Γ,∀xA
Introduction of positive connectives
⊢ Θ ⇓ t+
⊢ Θ ⇓ A ⊢ Θ ⇓ B
⊢ Θ ⇓ A ∧+ B
⊢ Θ ⇓ Ai
⊢ Θ ⇓ A1 ∨
+ A2
⊢ Θ ⇓ A[t/x]
⊢ Θ ⇓ ∃xA
Figure 1: The focused proof system LKF for classical logic.
Here, P is positive, N is negative, C is a positive formula or
a negative literal, Θ consists of positive formulas and negative
literals, and x is not free in Θ, Γ. Endsequents have the form
⊢ · ⇑ Γ.
an occurrence of either ∨+ or ∨−; similarly with ∧
and with the logical constants for true t and false f .
For simplicity, we shall assume that polarization for
atomic formulas is a global assignment to all atomic
formulas. Properly speaking, focused proof systems
contain polarized formulas and not simply formulas.
Theorem LKF is sound and complete for classical
logic. More precisely, letB be a first order formula and let
B′ be a polarization of B. Then B is provable in classical
logic if and only if there is an LKF proof of ⊢ · ⇑ B′ (23).
Notice that polarization does not affect provability but it
does affect the shape of possible LKF proofs. To illustrate
an application of the correctness of LKF, we show how it
provides a direct proof the following theorem.
Herbrand’s Theorem Let B is quantifier-free formula
and let x¯ be a (non-empty) list of variables containing
the free variables of B. The formula ∃x¯B is classically
provable if and only if there is a list of substitutions
θ1, . . . , θm (m ≥ 1), all with domain x¯, such that the
(quantifier-free) disjunction Bθ1 ∨ · · · ∨ Bθm is provable
(i.e., tautologous).
Proof. The converse direction is straightforward. Thus,
assume that ∃x¯B is provable. Let B′ be the result of
polarizing all occurrences of propositional connectives
negatively. By the completeness of LKF, there is an LKF
proof Ξ of ⊢ ∃x¯B ⇑ ·. The only sequents of the form
⊢ Θ ⇑ · in Ξ are such that Θ is equal to {∃x¯B′} ∪ L
for L a multiset of literals. Such a sequent can only
be proved by a Decide rule by focusing on either a
positive literal in L or the original formula ∃x¯B′: in the
latter case, the synchronous phase above it provides a
substitution for all the variables in x¯. One only needs to
collect all of these substitutions into a list θ1, . . . , θm and
then show that the proof Ξ is essentially also a proof of
⊢ B′θ1 ∨
+ · · · ∨+ B′θm ⇑ ·. QED.
7.2. Positive and negative macro inference rules
Focused proof systems such as LKF allow us to change
the size of inference rules with which we work. Let us
call individual introduction rules (such as displayed in
Section 6.1 and in Figure 1) “micro-rules”. An entire
phase within a focused proof can be seen as a “macro-
rule”. In particular, consider the following derivation.
⊢ Θ, D ⇑ N1 · · · ⊢ Θ, D ⇑ Nn
⊢ Θ, D ⇓ D
⊢ Θ, D ⇑ ·
Here, the selection of the formula D for the focus can
be taken as selecting among several macro-rules: this
derivation illustrates one such macro-rule: the inference
rule with conclusion ⊢ Θ, D ⇑ · and with n ≥ 0 premises
⊢ Θ, D ⇑ N1, . . . ,⊢ Θ, D ⇑ Nn (where N1, . . . , Nn are
negative formulas). We shall say that this macro-rule
is positive. Similarly, there is a corresponding negative
macro-rule with conclusion, say, ⊢ Θ, D ⇑ Ni, and with
m ≥ 0 premises of the form ⊢ Θ, D, C ⇑ ·, where C is a
multiset of positive formulas or negative literals.
In this way, focused proofs allow us to view the
construction of proofs from conclusions of the form
⊢ Θ ⇑ · as first attaching a positive macro rule (by
focusing on some formula in Θ) and then attaching
negative inference rules to the resulting premises until
one is again to sequents of the form ⊢ Θ′ ⇑ ·. Such
a combination of a positive macro rule below negative
macro rules is often called a bipole (2).
7.3. Fixed points and equality
In order for capture some interesting computational
problems, the logic of propositional connectives and
first-order quantifiers can be augmented with equality
and fixed point operators. Consider the left and right
introduction rules for = and µ given in Figure 2. Notice
that since the left and right introduction rules for µ are
the same, µ is self-dual: that is, the De Morgan dual of µ
is µ. It is possible to have a more expressive proof theory
for fixed points that provides also for least and greatest
fixed points (see, for example, (6; 4)): in that case, the
De Morgan dual of the least fixed point is the greatest
fixed point.
Example Identify the natural numbers as terms
involving 0 for zero and s for successor. The following
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Γ, B(µB)t¯ ⊢ ∆
Γ, µBt¯ ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆, B(µB)t¯
Γ ⊢ ∆, µBt¯
Γσ ⊢ ∆σ
Γ, s = t ⊢ ∆
†
Γ, s = t ⊢ ∆
‡
Γ ⊢ ∆, t = t
Figure 2: Introduction rules for = and µ. B is a formula with
n ≥ 0 variables abstracted and t¯ is a list of n terms. The †
proviso requires the terms s and t to be unifiable and σ to be
their most general unifier. The ‡ proviso requires that the terms
s and t are not unifiable.
⊢ Θσ ⇑ Γσ
⊢ Θ ⇑ Γ, s 6= t
†
⊢ Θ ⇑ Γ, s 6= t
‡
⊢ Θ ⇓ t = t
⊢ Θ ⇑ Γ, B(µB)t¯
⊢ Θ ⇑ Γ, µBt¯
⊢ Θ ⇓ B(µB)t¯
⊢ Θ ⇓ µBt¯
Figure 3: Focused inference rules for = and µ. The proviso †
and ‡ and the definition of σ are the same as above.
simple logic program defines two predicates on natural
numbers.
nat 0 ⊂ true.
nat (s X) ⊂ nat X.
leq 0 Y ⊂ true.
leq (s X) (s Y ) ⊂ leq X Y.
The predicate nat can be written as the fixed point
µ(λpλx.(x = 0) ∨ ∃y.(s y) = x ∧ p y)
and binary predicate leq (less-than-or-equal) can be
written as the fixed point
µ(λqλxλy.(x = 0) ∨ ∃u∃v.(s u) = x ∧ (s v) = y ∧ q u v).
In a similar fashion, any Horn clause specification can be
made into fixed point specifications (mutual recursions
requires standard encoding techniques).
These two logical connectives can be added to LKF
as follows. First, we classify both = and µ as positive
connectives (this choice is forced for equality while µ
can be polarized either way). The (one-sided) focused
versions of the introduction rules above are given in
Figure 3.
Example Consider proving the positive focused
sequent
⊢ Θ ⇓ (leq m n ∧+ N1) ∨
+ (leq n m ∧+ N2),
where m and n are natural numbers and leq is the fixed
point expression displayed above but this time with all
occurrences of ∧ and ∨ polarized with their positive
variants. If both N1 and N2 are negative formulas, then
there are exactly two possible macro rules: one with
premise ⊢ Θ ⇑ N1 when m ≤ n and one with premise
⊢ Θ ⇑ N2 when n ≤ m (thus, if m = n, either premise
is possible). In this sense, a macro inference rule can
contain an entire Prolog-style computation.
Example Macro rules can be built to match many
computational situations. Consider, for example, defining
simulation as the (greatest) fixed point of the equivalence
sim P Q ≡ ∀P ′∀A[P
A
−→ P ′ ⊃ ∃Q′[Q
A
−→ Q′∧sim P ′ Q′]].
Although the right-hand-side of this definition looks
complex, we show how it is possible to see proof
search with this formula as being exactly two macro
inference rules. First, the expression P
A
−→ P ′ is,
presumably, given via some SOS (structured operational
semantic) specifications. Such specifications are simple,
syntax-directed inference rules that can be captured
as a least fixed point expression. As above, we will
view such fixed point expressions as purely positive
formulas. Thus, the expression ∀P ′∀A[P
A
−→ P ′ ⊃
·] is a negative macro rule: since all possible actions
A and continuations P ′ must be computed, there are
no choices to be made in building a proof for this
expression. (Here, we are assuming that the implication
B ⊃ C is rendered as ¬B ∨− C in the polarized
setting.) On the other hand, focusing on the expression
∃Q′[Q
A
−→ Q′∧+ ·] yields a non-invertible, positive macro
rule. In this way, the focused proof system is aligned
directly with the structure of the actual (model-checking)
problem. Notice that if one wishes to communicate a
proof of a simulation to a proof checker, no information
regarding the use of the negative macro rule needs
to be communicated since the proof checker can also
perform the computation behind that inference rule (i.e.,
enumerating all possible transitions of a given process
P ).
7.4. The engineering of proof systems
The fact that an entire computation can fit within a
macro rule (using purely positive fixed point expressions)
provides a great deal of flexibility in designing inference
rules. Such flexibility allows inference rules to be
designed so that they correspond to an “action” within
a given computational system. One should note that
placing arbitrary computation within an inference rule is
probably too much: we usually use the term “inference
rule” for some step of a proof for which it is decidable to
check validity. Thus, some care should be exercised in
balancing the complexity of a macro rule with the needs
of proof systems to have their correctness be decidable.
Another technique in applying focusing proofs is the
use of delays. Within LKF, we can define the delaying
operators
∂+(B) = B ∧+ t+ and ∂−(B) = B ∧− t−.
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Clearly, B, ∂−(B), and ∂+(B) are all logically equivalent
but ∂−(B) is always negative and ∂+(B) is always
positive. If one wishes to break a positive macro rule
resulting from focusing on a given positive formula into
smaller pieces, then one can insert ∂−(·) into that
formula. Similarly, inserting ∂+(·) can limit the size of a
negative macro rule. By inserting many delay operators,
a focused proof can be made to emulate an unfocused
proof.
In general, proofs can be very large objects. If they
are to be checked and communicated, then there
must be some mechanisms that allow for exploring
trade-offs between their size and their checking time.
Focused proof systems here can help. First, although
not illustrated here, focused proof systems can certainly
contain versions of the cut-rule so lemmas can be
incorporated into focused proof objects. Second, since
macro inference rules correspond to computational
steps, the designer of a proof system should often have a
good sense of whether or not the search for short proofs
could be transferred to the proof checker. For example,
in the case of the judgment P
A
−→ P ′, one might expect
that the proof checker could search for proofs of such
judgments given that this judgment is defined over (finite)
syntactic expressions. Thus, by asking the proof checker
to do some proof search, the size of proof certificates
could be variably reduced.
8. THE UNITY OF PROOF SYSTEMS
Recent work in applying proof theory to the foundations
of computational logic systems reveals that there are
significant chances that a range of proof systems for,
at least, classical, intuitionistic, and linear logics can be
given a common foundation. We describe some of this
recent work below.
Alternative approaches to unbounded behavior
While Girard’s original proposal to extend the core of
linear logic (MALL) with the exponentials (?, !) in order
to achieve unbounded behaviors is elegant, especially
in its simplicity, this approach has some deficiencies. In
particular, the use of exponentials breaks up focused
proofs into smaller and smaller phases, thus negating
the applicability of focusing in the first place. There have
been at least a couple of recent proposals that try to
provide alternatives to the exponentials. For example,
Baelde and Miller (6; 4) proposed adding least and
greatest fixed points to MALL directly. The resulting logic
is surprisingly elegant and expressive. MALL plus fixed
points has been used to describe the logical foundations
of a model checker (5) and is being used to design a new
theorem proving architecture for the search for proofs
involving induction. Liang and Miller (24) have blended
together classical logic (which has natural notions of
unbounded behavior) and MALL. The resulting logic is
an exciting new approach to the Unity of Logic (17),
one where we can retain focusing behavior for classical,
intuitionistic, and linear logics.
Logic programming vs model checking vs theorem
proving The differences between these three activ-
ities can be characterized by their different uses of
fixed points. Logic programming involves may behavior
only, which involves unfolding fixed points and non-
deterministically picking a path to a success. On the
other hand, both model checking and theorem proving
deal with must as well as may behavior. These two
differ in that model checkers generally assume finite
fixed points (or have specialized methods for handling
loops) while (inductive) theorem provers use invariants
to characterize possible infinite unfoldings. Given these
rough descriptions, it is possible to see rich ways that
these activities can fit together into one system (and
one logic!) and enhance each other: for example, a
theorem prover might prove certain symmetry lemmas
(via induction) and these could be used in the model
checker to reduce search space. Similarly, tabling within
model checkers can be seen as lemma generation in
theorem provers (28).
Many proof systems just differ in polarization
Nigam and Miller (30) have recently shown that a
range of commonly used proof systems (sequent
calculus, natural deduction, tableaux, Hilbert-style, etc)
are, in fact, just different polarizations of a common
specification for inference rules. Thus it should be
possible to create a single, formal framework for
specifying and implementing many proof systems.
Accounting for rewriting proofs Algebraic-style
rewriting is an important proof technique for reasoning
about functional expressions. To what extent can
rewriting with functions be captured within a relational
setting? Functions can, of course, encode relations
using set-valued functions and different order relations
(Plotkin/Hoare/Smyth). Conversely, relations can directly
encode functions: the graphs of functions are, simply,
graphs of relations. It is also interesting to note that
the restriction on relations that make them into functions
(for all input values there is a unique output value) has
a precise connection to focusing: in particular, if the
binary predicate P represents a function (first argument
denoting the input and the second argument, the output),
then the formulas
∀x.P (t, x) ⊃ Q(x) and ∃x.P (t, x) ∧Q(x)
are logically equivalent: the underlying P -typed quanti-
fier is, in fact, self dual. This observation immediately
relates to how one can structure focused proofs.
Model-checking-as-deduction and deduction-as-
model-checking As we have mentioned, many
(high-level aspects of) model checking can be seen
as focused deduction with fixed points (4; 5; 6). Other
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recent work (12) has shown that (in certain weak
logics), deduction can be achieved by looking for
winning strategies in suitable games. The search for
winning strategies is a typical and important example
of something model checkers can do well. These two
lines of research make it possible to hope that model
checkers and theorem provers might ultimately be seen
as sharing many common features that might allow their
implementations to be tightly integrated.
9. BENEFITS OF A UNIFYING FRAMEWORK
The fractured nature of logical systems can be
addressed by ad hoc solutions: standardized challenge
problems, standardized frameworks, XML formats for
formulas and proofs, protocols for plugging one tool
into another tool, etc. While well engineered and
inter-operating systems can have important practical
consequences, one should insist that broader and more
expressive foundations for computational logic systems
be developed.
There are a number of important consequences to
providing such a common framework to logic and its
uses in computer systems.
Flexible proof certificates An emphasis on unity
(along with the technical results required to make it real)
can be a game changer. Consider, for example, what
can happen if a highly flexible form of proof certificate
(one of the promises of focused proof system) were
available. No longer are formal systems isolated. If
proof certificates can be transmitted and easily checked,
then one formal system can accept proofs from other
systems no matter how well those formal systems trust
each other. The existence of such proof certificates
open an entirely new world of possibilities for attacking
the problems of proving systems formally correct. For
example, it should be possible to have libraries of proofs
that take contributions from a wide range of deductive
engines and not be limited to submissions from just
one deduction engine. Also, since the proof certificates
here are based on proof theory principles, rich search
conditions against the library should be possible. Also
possible should be a marketplace of proofs: the most
successful practitioners in formal methods will be those
who can choose the right combination of tools for getting
formal results. Such a marketplace could lead to many
new tools being developed for specialize but important
domains (e.g., avionics).
Transfer of implementation techniques A formal
and rich foundation for a wide variety of computational
logic systems will allow researchers and developers to
transfer solutions they have developed in one area—
e.g., data structures, algorithms, or search heuristics—
to other areas.
Rich integration of different technologies In a
similar way, it should be possible to see that different
tools are, at least formally, performing deduction in the
same kind of proof systems as another tool: as such, rich
forms of integration of those tools should be possible.
For example, model checking and inductive/coinductive
theorem proving can be seen as building sequent
calculus proofs in a logic with fixed points (6; 4). Such
a common deductive setting can be used to more tightly
integrate these two rather different styles of deduction.
New breeds of computational logic systems One
reason to push for new foundations over engineered
integration is that such new foundations should make
it possible to provide for completely new approaches to
the architecture and scope of logic-based systems. For
example, linear logic (16) was presented as a revolution
in computation logic and it has, indeed, made it possible
to rethink a great deal of the conceptual nature of logic.
Today, we have much richer ways of thinking about the
structural rules (e.g., contraction, weakening), about the
role of games and interaction in logic, about concurrency
in proofs, and about organizing inference rules into large-
scale inference rules.
Teaching of logic An extremely important aspect of
the foundation of any science is its ability to explain
clearly the totality of the science. A new foundation
should provide a meaningful way to organize and present
most aspects of computational logic systems. In turn,
such developments will lead to new ways to teach logic
so that its unity can be stressed.
10. CONCLUSION AND SOME CHALLENGES
Specialization and compartmentalization will continue
to be important activities from both an industrial and
academic point-of-view. But we must ask for more: we
should insist also on the unity of logic from which one
would expect deep new insights into the foundations of
computer science and greatly improved and integrated
tools for dealing with the correctness of software and
hardware systems. We conclude by listing some specific
challenges.
Challenge 1: Unify a wide range of logical features into a
single framework. How best can we explain the many
enhancements that have been designed for logic: for
example, classical / intuitionistic / linear, fixed points,
first-order / higher-order quantification, modalities, and
temporal operators? Can we explain these as involving
orthogonal compositions as is the case for quantification
and classical propositional connectives?
Challenge 2: Unify a wide spectrum of proof systems.
If computer logic systems build proofs objects (explicitly
or implicitly), those proofs can come from a wide
range of different proof systems: for example, sequent
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calculus, natural deduction, tableaux, Hilbert-style proof,
resolution refutations, DPLL-trees, tabled deduction,
matrix-based proofs, rewriting, etc. There is strong,
recent evidence that several of these style of proof
systems can be accounted for uniformly within a single
(focused) proof system (24; 30; 32). Can a single,
declarative proof checker be built that can check all of
these forms of proofs?
Challenge 3: Unify the disciplines of theorem proving,
model checking, and computation. Although these
disciplines can all be viewed as certain kinds of
deduction in a logic with fixed points, the literature
and systems behind these disciplines are wildly
different. Can we develop a principled approach to their
integration?
Challenge 4: Design new architectures for supporting
a wide range of deduction techniques within a single,
integrated framework. A great number of algorithms
and data structures have been developed to build
working model checkers and theorem provers. These
different domains share little in common. If we can
establish common proof theoretic explanations of these
different activities, can we also develop common,
universally agreed upon implementation architectures
and techniques than can be shared across these
activities?
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